Professor Meir Litvak
Are Iranian Kurds openly calling for regime change in Iran? If so, how common is this view among Kurdish communities?
I think there is a majority among the Kurds who want regime change in Iran. You have to remember several things that, you know, I’m not sure most Kurds want to secede from Iran, but they wanted some sort of cultural autonomy or other autonomy, which the Iranian regime did not give them. There have been complaints among Kurds, and the Kurdish areas are still regarded as among the poorest areas in Iran. You know, Baluchistan is worse, but the Kurdish area is only a bubble to stand on, probably. Now, Baluchistan has Sunnis and non-Persians, so they suffer from both handicaps.
Now, there were complaints among many Kurds in recent years that the number of Kurdish people who were executed by the regime was much higher than that of any other group, that the regime claimed that they were executing criminals, but in fact, the people who were executed were Kurdish activists. If you look at the protests in 2022 following the Mahsa Amini case—she was Kurdish—we did see more widespread demonstrations in the Kurdish areas and other areas because maybe they felt that she was murdered by the police, that they treated her more brutally because she was Kurdish.
So I think there is a stronger resentment among many Kurds against the present regime in Iran, and therefore, my assumption is that most of them want regime change. They want, again, autonomy, equality, etc., but certainly they don’t believe that the current regime is capable of providing it.
Kurds are mainly support regime change
Some of the Kurdish groups are also Shia. What’s the position of these Shia groups? Are they supporting the regime, or are they also against the regime?
I think that even among the Shias there is a growing resentment against the regime. You have to remember that most of the Iranians are Shia. Ninety percent of the Iranians are Shia, and if you look at the demonstrations that took place in January in Tehran and Isfahan, these are Shia areas. So it was not a protest of Sunnis against the regime; it was a protest of many Iranians from all groups, and again most of them are Shia, who protested against the regime.
So my guess is that the Kurds who are Shia, because they’re also Kurds and the Kurdish people share this opposition or resentment of the regime. You know, there is a minority that supports the regime. Now, if you look at President Pezeshkian, he is half Azeri, half Kurdish, so certainly he identifies with the regime. But I’m not saying that no one supports the regime; I think that they are the minority.
Considering the military strength and organization of Iranian Kurdish groups, could they realistically help overthrow the Iranian regime if they received support from the US and Israel?
I doubt it. I don’t think it’s a smart policy. Even let’s say that there are several thousand Kurdish fighters, you know, the Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij have tens of thousands of fighters. They are hundreds of kilometers away from Tehran. How are they going to topple the regime in Tehran if they are in the Kurdish areas?
More importantly, or equally importantly, I believe that at the moment, many Kurds will, let’s say, start a revolt against the regime. As a Kurdish revolt, it may drive many of the Persians, Persian speakers, to support the regime because they will be afraid that Iran will be fragmented.
Also, if you look historically, if you look at the period of 1945-46, when there was the semi-autonomous Azerbaijan Republic in Iran under Soviet auspices, and there was also the Mahabad Republic in Iran, both on the same. The relations between the Azeris and the Kurds were not very good. There were tensions among them.
So I’m not sure that, there’s a Kurdish movement, the Turks, the Azeris, who are Shia, and Turks, will be happy with this movement. And therefore, I don’t think it is a smart policy, and I doubt very much that it can really play an important role in changing the regime in Iran.
Most Azeris in Iran do not want the fragmentation of Iran
What is the position of Iran Azeris? Will they support the regime, or will they support this fragmentation?
No, well, my guess is that most Azeris in Iran do not want fragmentation of Iran. If many of them want, maybe they would like autonomy, in cultural autonomy. Sometimes, many, many of them may feel that the government does not treat them very well.
I’ll give you an example. You know the tragedy of Lake Urmia in Azerbaijan. This is the largest lake in Iran, and completely dried up, a major ecological disaster. There were many complaints among Azeris in Iran that the government was not doing enough, almost nothing, to address this problem. They said, why? Because we are Azeris.
At the same time, many Azeris are well integrated into the system in Iran. They feel they have many, many high positions in the Iranian system. Think of the former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was an Azeri, and he was the Prime Minister of Iran. You think of others, generals, senior Ayatollahs, and so on. So I don’t think they want to separate from Iran. They want Iran to be fragmented.
Let me give you another example. It’s an old example, 30 years ago, there were public protests in the city of Ardabil in Iran, Azerbaijan. They wanted Ardabil to receive the status of a provincial capital. What was their argument? We had the largest number of martyrs in the Iran-Iraq war in defending Iran. Therefore, we deserve to be received. By the way, they succeeded. They highlighted the fact that they were Iranian patriots.
So I doubt very much that most Azeris would want to split Iran or fragment Iran. I don’t think so.
Israel has strong relations with Iraqi Kurds, but not with Iranian Kurds
Do you think Israel sees Iranian Kurds as a serious partner that could open a new front against Iran, or is this mainly a way to pressure or distract Tehran?
Frankly, I don’t know. It may be both, depending on who. Historically, there were good relations between Israel and the Kurds in Iraq until it ended when the Shah of Iran betrayed the Kurds in Iraq in 1975. So Israelis have a certain sympathy for the Kurds, but practically, I don’t see how Israel can establish good relations with the Kurds if you look at their geographical position.
Under the Shah, Israel could maintain relations with the Kurds through Iran. But nowadays, there is no way Israel can maintain good relations, close relations with the Kurds in Iran, because they are surrounded by Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, who are not supportive of their political goals. So I don’t see how Israel can really develop, if it wanted, very strong ties with the Kurds in Iran.
Given the current regional conflicts, how likely is it that Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq would join operations against Iran?
I doubt it. First of all, the Kurds in Syria were betrayed by the Americans and they lost the battle. The Kurds in Iran, in Iraq, maybe some of them would join. I think again depending on which part of Kurdish Iraq you are talking about, because historically, you know, the PUC, the Talabani faction, was more pro-Iranian, whereas the, but at the same time, you know, the Barzani faction was closer to Turkey. And I don’t think they would go against Iran and then lose Turkish support
How could Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria help support or organize cross-border actions targeting the Iranian regime?
In Iraq, they can support cross-border actions. Let’s say, an airlift by the U.S. in Iraqi Kurdistan to transfer weapons to Iran, okay, maybe that’s possible. The Americans do it. But they don’t have major forces.
If you look at the Barzani faction in Iraq, they probably have a very deep grudge against Iran. Because it was Qasem Soleimani who helped crush their attempt of independence several years ago. So they probably have a lot of resentment against Iran, have a deep grudge against Iran.
The question is, can they translate this grudge into action? That’s a different story. It depends again on if they get supplies, what kind of weapons, and other than money, etc. Intentions are not enough in politics.
What strategic benefits might Israel gain if it cooperates with Kurdish groups in its confrontation with Iran?
If Israel regards Iran as the greatest threat to its security and existence, then obviously anything that will undermine Iran, will weaken Iran, can be seen as positive from the Israeli point of view. The question here again is what is the difference between, aspirations and possibilities? What can Israel really do, which is a different story. Also, of course, the capability of the Kurds, which is another story. So maybe many Israelis entertain the hope that somehow, with the Kurds, they can either undermine the regime in Iran, or then they can establish friendship, but I think there is a gap here between intentions, aspirations, and political or geopolitical realities.
Inside Israeli policy circles, what kind of debates might exist about the risk of relying on ethnic groups like the Kurds in a conflict with Iran?
I think it would be, the difference would be between two groups, two schools of thought. One believes that it is possible that Iran can be fragmented. They believe that Iran is unstable and a fragmented Iran would be very good for Israel. There are others, and I would say I belong to them, who believe that, yes, Iran is a heterogeneous country, but the belief that Iran is going to fragment tomorrow is exaggerated.
It is not really a sound belief. People who believe so do not understand some of the links between, for instance, the Azeris and the Persians. They assume that because they are different, they will separate. Therefore, it would be a mistaken policy to pursue a policy that aims at fragmenting Iran, because it is not going to happen and it will be harmful.
Do you think that Persians and Azerbaijanis will support the unity of Iran?
Yes, of course. And probably many of them, at least half of the Azerbaijanis, if not more. I cannot honestly estimate the exact numbers. But my belief is that they would not necessarily want to completely separate from Iran. Because for historical reasons, economic reasons.
If it will be from the Kurds, then I think the Azerbaijanis would prefer to align with the Persians against the Kurds.
After the developments in Syria, Kurds believed that they had been betrayed by the United States and Israel. Do you think Syrian Kurds were justified in thinking this?
They were certainly betrayed by the Americans because they helped the Americans fight ISIS for many years. I doubt very much if Israel had any much relations with them, contacts with them. Again, think of geography, how can Israel help the Kurds in Syria? Through Turkey, through Iraq? How can Israel do it? The Americans supported them for a while. They helped the Americans. They played a very important role in fighting ISIS. And then, yes, Trump reached an agreement with the Syrian leadership, Muhammed al Shara, that he will support his claim to unify Syria under his control.
And yes, the Americans stopped supporting the Kurds. So I think they have a good reason to believe that the Americans betrayed them. And by the way, I think they have a good reason not to believe the Americans once again.
Especially in Turkish public opinion, it is often claimed that Israel is pursuing the idea of a Greater Kurdistan. Does Israel actually have such a long-term project?
I doubt it very much. PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan was very anti-Israeli. He was for many years very hostile to Israel. So why would Israel help Ocalan or the PKK when they were very hostile to Israel?
Yes, Israel has supported the Kurds in Iraq, until 1975. There are now maybe some academics, there may be Israeli activities in Kurdish Syria or something, but I doubt very much again how Israel help the Kurds in Syria. I doubt it very much. And I don’t think Israel has these plans for the Middle East.
I think it’s an exaggeration of Israeli imagination or plans if it’s inflating Israeli beliefs in some sort of conspiratorial way. I don’t think it’s realistic.
In an article published in the Wall Street Journal, it was suggested that after Iran, the next target should be Turkey. How do you evaluate such circulations?
Tragically, as an Israeli, our relations with Turkey are not good. It’s a sad development for Israelis. But there’s a major difference here between the fact that Israelis are very unhappy with Turkish President Erdogan, with his policies. But from that to confrontation with Turkey, there’s a major difference. And with all due respect to Israel, Turkey is much bigger. Turkey has one of the largest armies in the world. It’s a NATO member.
You have to be completely crazy from the Israeli point of view to believe, to dream that you will confront Turkey. If you have someone in Israel who thinks so, maybe.
But I doubt very much that any serious politician or army officer would even entertain this, I would say, hallucination.
Turkey has, supported Hamas and so on, so it led to resentment against Turkey. And then when we had one comparison to Nazi Germany for Israelis, this is totally unacceptable.
Do you think the United States and Israel are planning an Iran that suits their own interests, or is their goal simply to overthrow the regime?
I cannot tell you what the Americans think. Probably Trump believes that the change in Iran would then would give America Iran oil to, then the US will have access to Iranian oil and to Iranian markets, etc.
I think from the Israeli point of view, the first priority and probably the overwhelming priority is that Iran would not cease to be a strategic, almost existential threat to Israel. This is, I think, genuine belief among many Israelis. They are truly afraid that Iran wants to destroy Israel. Now, Iran supports Hamas, Iran supports Hezbollah, Iran speaks openly about the need to eliminate Israel. Marg bar Israel (Death to Israel) is a very popular slogan in Iranian rallies. For the Israelis, the removal of the strategic threat from Iran is the utmost priority.
What will happen later? Let’s say there is a new regime in Iran and there will be good relations with Israel, wonderful. But this is not the real goal. The real goal from Israelis, I think, is first and foremost to remove the strategic military threat from Iran or posed by Iran.
Well, suppose the regime in Iran collapses, but the country cannot achieve stability for a long time and a civil war breaks out. Would such a scenario benefit the United States and Israel?
I’m not sure it would benefit the U.S., because again, I think the U.S. wants that after regime change, it would be able to establish good economic relations with Iran, have access to Iranian oil, etc. From a narrow Israeli security point of view, unstable Iran is not bad. Because then Iran would not pose a threat to Israel. And then we’re talking here from a purely security point of view. I think this is what matters now for most Israelis, and probably for most of the Israeli leadership.
How long will Israel continue focusing on overthrowing regimes? It lives in the middle of a vast Sunni-majority region. Yesterday it was Syria, today Iran, tomorrow it might be Turkey, Egypt, or another country. Do you think this kind of war-oriented strategy pursued by Israel is sustainable or wise?
I don’t think that this is the Israeli strategy. You know, I think the Israeli strategy is, I mean, not to wage war against Egypt and Saudi. Netanyahu had a dream of establishing a diplomatic relationship with Saudi until the war in Gaza. Netanyahu thought that with Abrahamic peace, he could enter the peace and Israel is an important country in the region. Now again, with Turkey, what matters for Israel is Turkish policy. If there will be a change in Turkish policy towards Israel, that would be a little different story. Israelis don’t think that they can confront Turkish. They don’t see Turkey as an unfriendly country, absolutely just because of its policies.
But you have to remember that until two years ago, we had imports from Turkey of more than $5 billion a year. And that is, we had extensive economic relations with Turkey until two years ago. Israel was Turkey’s second trade partner after Egypt in the Middle East.
Until a few years ago, half a million Israelis used to go to Turkey every year as tourists. That is, Israelis do not see Turkey as an enemy. They have a problem, true, with Turkish current Turkish policy. If this policy would change, then there would be a totally different era in Israeli-Turkish relations.
And it’s not that the Israelis dream of fighting everyone all the time. We have to have an economy to deal with.
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Director, the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies
The Parviz and Pouran Nazarian Chair for Modern Iranian Studies
Department of Middle Eastern and African History
Tel Aviv University