The Eastern Mediterranean has increasingly emerged as a focal point of strategic realignment, where energy resources, maritime boundaries, and security concerns intersect with broader geopolitical rivalries. In recent years, the cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus has evolved into a multidimensional framework that extends beyond traditional diplomacy, encompassing energy infrastructure development, regional security coordination, and alignment with European strategic interests. This trilateral configuration reflects not only shared economic incentives but also a response to shifting regional power dynamics and contested maritime claims.
This interview with Prof. Efrat Aviv, Department of General History and senior member of the Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) at Bar-Ilan University, Israel, offers a detailed analytical perspective on these developments and their wider implications. Within this complex environment, questions of deterrence, alliance formation, and regional stability have gained renewed significance. The interplay between energy projects such as EastMed, evolving security cooperation, and the positioning of external actors like Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon highlights the broader transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean into a strategically competitive space.
Prof. Efrat Aviv
The common strategic foundation of Israel’s foreign policy and its energy agreements with Greece and Cyprus rests on the creation of a stable Eastern Mediterranean axis that combines energy, security, and geopolitical interests. This cooperation is based on the development and export of natural gas to Europe while bypassing Turkey and Russia, on curbing Turkish hegemonic ambitions in the maritime domain, and on strengthening status-quo states that operate in accordance with international law. At the same time, the relationship is deepened through military exercises and security cooperation and is anchored in a normative perception of partnership among Eastern Mediterranean democracies connected to the broader European-Western sphere.
Economic cooperation beyond energy
The cooperation frameworks established in the Cyprus–Greece–Israel triangle are not limited to the economic sphere alone but also carry a clear—though informal—security and deterrence dimension. Beyond energy and infrastructure projects, the three states have developed joint military exercises, air and naval cooperation, and strategic coordination on regional security issues, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. The very existence of an ongoing cooperative framework, based on shared interests and coordinated military presence, conveys a deterrent message to rival regional actors, most notably Turkey, and strengthens regional stability even in the absence of a formal security alliance.
Cyprus as a regional actor
In my opinion, Cyprus is not becoming an independent leading actor in the classical sense of a regional power for the time being (who can predict the future though?), but it is effectively leveraging its geopolitical position to enhance its regional weight. Through cooperation with Israel and Greece, and by relying on its membership in the European Union, Cyprus deliberately aligns itself with the strategies of actors larger than itself, yet does so by choice rather than subordination. In this way, it functions as a mediating and anchoring actor, linking regional interests with European frameworks, strengthening its diplomatic and security standing, and increasing its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean despite its limited power capabilities.
Strategic benefits for Israel and Greece
Greece and Israel derive tangible benefits from this cooperation in the fields of energy, security, and regional diplomacy. Israel gains a strategic route for exporting natural gas to European markets, strengthens its position as a legitimate actor in the Mediterranean arena, and deepens security cooperation with states that are members of the European Union and NATO. Greece benefits from reinforcing its role as a regional energy hub, enhancing its geopolitical standing in the Eastern Mediterranean, and expanding military cooperation that helps balance Turkish pressure. Cyprus plays a central role as a geographic, legal, and institutional anchor: it serves as a connecting link between Israel and Greece, provides European legitimacy through its EU membership, and enables the institutionalization of joint energy and security projects within a stable regional framework.
Turkey’s role in regional tensions
If current trends continue, the position of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean holds significant opportunities alongside notable risks in the medium to long term. On the positive side, further deepening of cooperation may consolidate a stable regional axis combining security, energy, and ties with Europe, strengthen European energy independence, and enhance the three states’ status as central actors in the Mediterranean arena. At the same time, there are risks of geopolitical escalation with Turkey and other regional actors, the vulnerability of offshore energy infrastructure to military or hybrid threats, and overdependence on long-term projects exposed to shifts in global energy markets and the transition to renewable energy.
In addition, increasing politicization of these partnerships could turn the axis into a source of friction rather than a stabilizing factor if not managed with diplomatic caution. From a broader regional perspective, it can be argued that cooperation among four Eastern Mediterranean states could have benefited the entire region and contributed to long-term stability.
However, Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy, its preference for heavy investment in arms production and self-militarization over investment in its citizens and in addressing its faltering economy, makes it difficult for it to integrate into such a cooperative regional framework. Instead, Turkey appears to favor deepening relations with countries such as Iran rather than building trust and cooperation with its other Eastern Mediterranean neighbors.
Egypt’s strategic calculations
Egypt may deepen its involvement in regional cooperation frameworks in the Eastern Mediterranean, but it is likely to do so cautiously and on the basis of narrow interest-based calculations, rather than as part of a formal and openly declared alliance with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. Public discourse in Egypt regarding the war in Gaza is extremely harsh, and the Egyptian regime employs critical rhetoric toward Israel, driven in part by the scale of destruction in Gaza and by the declared fear of Palestinian displacement into Sinai, which Cairo defines as a national and security red line.
At the same time, there is also a degree of Israeli suspicion toward Egypt, particularly regarding its role at the Rafah border crossing, the Philadelphi Corridor, and Cairo’s ongoing relations with Hamas.
At the same time, it is important to distinguish between public rhetoric and the strategic interests of the Egyptian regime. Although Egypt maintains contacts with Hamas, grants it a certain degree of legitimacy in the Arab arena, and serves as a central mediator vis-à-vis the organization, Hamas is also perceived by the leadership in Cairo as a potential security threat and as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood—an explicit ideological and regime-level adversary of the al-Sisi government.
From a cold, interest-based perspective, Egypt does not fundamentally oppose the weakening of Hamas and may even benefit from the destruction of its military and governing capabilities, as long as this does not entail direct harm to Egypt’s security, sovereignty, or internal stability.
Lebanon, by contrast, is currently far removed from any realistic possibility of joining a regional cooperation framework that includes Israel.
The deep economic and political crisis, the collapse of state institutions, and the dominance of Hezbollah—a military-political actor largely subordinate to Iran—effectively negate Lebanon’s ability to act as an independent sovereign player in the regional arena. Even if potential energy-related interests exist, the ongoing confrontation with Israel and the subordination of strategic decision-making to non-state actors render the prospect of Lebanon’s participation in such a regional cooperative framework highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Political framework of the EastMed Project
The cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus provides the EastMed project with a decisive strategic contribution that goes beyond the technical aspect of laying a gas pipeline. First and foremost, it creates a coordinated political and legal framework among three states that share a clear interest in exporting Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe, thereby reducing regulatory uncertainty and strengthening investor confidence. At the same time, this cooperation adds a security and deterrence dimension to the project through maritime coordination, joint military exercises, and a coordinated military presence, all of which help protect offshore energy infrastructure from state and non-state threats.
In addition, the Israel–Greece–Cyprus axis anchors EastMed within a broader European context by establishing a direct link to the European Union and its member states, presenting the project as part of Europe’s energy security strategy. Finally, the existence of a coordinated regional partnership enhances the project’s resilience to external geopolitical pressures, most notably Turkish opposition, and enables it to be advanced not merely as an economic venture but as a long-term political and strategic instrument.
Turkey’s regional policy and its impact
Yes, there is a direct and substantial link between the strategic cooperation among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus and Turkey’s aggressive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly toward these three states. It should be emphasized that were it not for Turkey’s threatening rhetoric and concrete actions, this cooperation would not be perceived as a significant regional threat. The trilateral alignment is not an offensive initiative, but first and foremost a response to an assertive and destabilizing Turkish foreign policy.
From Israel’s perspective, one of the most troubling scenarios is the possibility that Turkey may seek to introduce a military or non-regular security presence in the Gaza Strip, whether under the framework of an international force or through indirect channels. Such a development could restrict the IDF’s freedom of action and, in practice, assist Hamas.
In addition, there is growing concern in Israel regarding the expansion of Turkey’s military presence in Syria, including intelligence assets, radar systems, and air-defense capabilities. These developments could constrain operational freedom and increase regional friction.
Israel’s position on Druze Autonomy
Israel does not actively promote the establishment of an independent Druze state in the Levant, but it also does not reject the idea in principle if such a development were to occur through broad agreement and within a legitimate state framework. The issue is primarily one of security and regional stability rather than ideology.
The Druze are viewed as a distinct minority embedded in existing states such as Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel’s approach emphasizes integration, protection, and stability. Any potential future arrangement would be evaluated based on whether it reduces violence and prevents external interference.
Israel maintains a long-standing commitment to the welfare and protection of Druze communities, whether as citizens or neighboring populations, and sees this commitment as moral, civic, and security-related.