In this context, questions about a potential U.S. military presence in Somaliland, the deepening crisis in Somalia, and Ethiopia’s renewed push for Red Sea access are no longer isolated developments—they are interconnected consequences of a broader geopolitical realignment. The Horn of Africa, long vulnerable due to weak state structures and external dependencies, now risks becoming an extension of the Gulf’s conflict dynamics.
According to Dr. Ahmed Hirad, a researcher and analyst specializing in Horn of Africa affairs, the region is entering a critical phase where internal fragilities intersect with global power competition. Hirad highlights how ongoing political instability in Somalia, the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and rivalries involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti are being exacerbated by the wider Iran-centered conflict.
The ongoing war involving Iran in the Gulf is no longer confined to the Middle East; its ripple effects are increasingly shaping the fragile geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. As tensions around critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb intensify, regional actors are being drawn into a complex web of shifting alliances and strategic calculations.
At the same time, external powers—including the United States, China, Turkey, and Gulf countries—are consolidating their positions without yet crossing into full-scale confrontation. In Hirad’sassessment, while regional actors are attempting to avoid direct entanglement in the Gulf war, increasing polarization may ultimately force them to align with competing blocs, raising the risk that the Horn of Africa could evolve into a secondary theater of geopolitical contestation.
The Prospects of a U.S. strategic presence in Somaliland
The United States is currently considering Somaliland’s offer to provide a military base, at a time when the US is increasingly keen to relocate its military base in neighboring Djibouti due to security concerns related to the proximity of the Chinese base there. Furthermore, Djibouti has been hesitant to align itself with the US vision regarding security in the southern Red Sea, having expressed reservations about its territory being used to launch attacks against the Houthi movement in Yemen, on the other side of the Bab El-Mandeb Strait.
Somalia’s deepening political crisis and scenarios for fragmentation
The political situation in Somalia, already a fragile state, is extremely precarious. Several Somali states are at odds with the central government in Mogadishu. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab remains a powerful force on the ground, demonstrating its ability to maintain a stalemate with the Somali government. Adding to this, Western financial support for the Somali government has dried up due to corruption. All these developments present us with grim scenarios, the most significant of which are:
1- Somalia’s descent into anarchy. While perhaps not as severe as the anarchy of 1991, given the existence of the states, Somalia could still transform from a unified state governed by a consensus government in Mogadishu into disparate political cantons with no common ground. Alternatively, the Somali states could be polarized into two blocs: one for and one against the government in Mogadishu—a scenario similar to the current political situation in Yemen.
2- A shift in the military balance and end of stalemate state between the Somali government and Al-Shabaab, with the latter gaining the upper hand. The United States has studied the possibility of Al-Shabaab seizing control of the country, and the previous administration saw no problem in dealing with them, much like it did with the Taliban.
3- Reaching a political agreement between Mogadishu and the states, but the margin of this possibility diminishes with time, due to the divergence of views between the parties.
Türkiye’s military presence and its impact on governance in Somalia
There is a significant Turkish penetration into all aspects of political and economic life in Somalia, and perhaps the recent Turkish-Somali agreement on oil field exploration and the unequal shares of the two parties is the best evidence of this presence and of this unnatural relationship between Ankara and Mogadishu. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the Turkish government is the real player in Villa Somalia and is the one pushing the Somali government to take political steps that have not received any positive response from the Somali states and opposition.
Al-Shabaab and the shifting military balance in Somalia
The military stalemate between the Somali government and al-Shabaab has been a reality for several years. Government victories in some areas are countered by al-Shabaab victories in others; this has been the overall pattern of developments on the ground between the two sides in recent years.
Western and African support has not enabled the Somali government to break this vicious cycle of military stalemate. Therefore, the most crucial factor for maintaining this balance is the continued flow of this support. Should it cease or dry up, Mogadishu could face a fate similar to that of Kabul in 2021.
Djibouti’s political continuity and emerging structural challenges
There is regional and continental consensus on accepting the election results that declared Ismail Omar Guellehthe winner with 97.8% of the vote. This is due to the absence of a Djiboutian figure capable of succeeding President Guelleh, or the lack of local consensus on a specific candidate. However, on the other hand, there is a strong possibility that the current Djiboutian government will continue to manage internal and external affairs with the same vision and tools.
This vision has created internal crises for this small country, such as its crippling debt to China, a youth unemployment rate that has reached 70%, and the Afar armed opposition (FRUD). The latter could have regional repercussions, as the Afar ethnic group is widespread in southeastern Eritrea and eastern Ethiopia, and has become a tool in the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Furthermore, the opposition supports Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, contrary to the Djiboutian government’s position.
Therefore, a local political situation has given rise to a local Afar opposition, but the effects of this opposition may not be confined to Djibouti. This is where the problem lies!
Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions and regional power dynamics
The issue of access to the sea is vital for Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been a landlocked country since 1993, following Eritrea’s secession. However, Eritrea’s secession was the result of a brutal civil war that brought Eritrean separatists (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to power. Despite the legal legitimacy of Eritrea’s independence, these victorious forces have failed to address border issues and the question of access to the sea through legal channels, which brought about significant harm to Ethiopia, even after the TPLF’s departure from power. This means that the conditions for a military confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea will always exist, regardless of who governs Addis Ababa and Asmara.
Regarding the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, announced in January 2024, it was declared defunct due to pressure from Turkey, Arab states, and African countries, according to a statement by former Somaliland President and current Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. However, given the current crisis in the Middle East and the increasing likelihood of the conflict spreading from the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to the southern Red Sea and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, it is possible that the MoU could be revived.
In addition to security concerns, economic factors might also motivate Ethiopia to revive the MoU. Ethiopia views Djibouti’s role as a transit country with resentment and a sense of injustice, particularly regarding the high fees Djibouti imposes on Ethiopian exports through its ports, which Addis Ababa officials consider extortion.
How might Ethiopia’s plans to build new dams affect the regional balance?
Ethiopia has legitimate ambitions for development and to utilize its untapped resources, which have been neglected due to water agreements dating back to the European colonial era. Unfortunately, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue has ignited hostility and rivalry between Addis Ababa and Cairo on both the political and diplomatic fronts. This has resulted in an Egyptian military presence in Somalia, as well as the formation of a tripartite axis between Cairo, Asmara, and Mogadishu to encircle Ethiopia.
The Iran War and the geopolitical transformation of the Horn of Africa
The shadow of war still looms over the Gulf despite the truce, and the immediate consequences of the conflict cannot be known until the dust settles. However, there are signs and indications of a major geopolitical shift in the region, such as the formation of opposing blocs and alliances among regional states. There is a growing rapprochement between India, Israel, Greece, and the UAE, contrasted with the growing closeness between Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.
There are understandings among the Horn of Africa states to distance themselves from the Gulf crisis, but these understandings will face a difficult test if polarization intensifies in the Middle East. The Horn of Africa states may find themselves with no alternative but to align with these blocs, given the intertwined relationships between the region and the Middle East.
However, what has been observed so far is:
1- Ethiopia and Somaliland seem to be leaning towards the first bloc, while Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti are leaning towards the second. The internal disputes among the Horn of Africa states could provide an opening for these blocs to use the Horn of Africa as an arena for settling scores.
2- Turkey, Egypt, Israel, and the UAE are present in the Horn of Africa, in addition to the American and Chinese presence. All these powers are currently in a phase of positioning and consolidating their influence, and will not reach a point of full-scale mobilization as long as the understandings among the leaders of the Horn of Africa remain in place.
As for the economic impact on the countries of the region, it is expected, given the fragility of the economies of the Horn of Africa countries and their dependence on external support in one form or another.