This interview features Mohamed Lilly, a Civil Affairs Liaison at MINUSMA in Gaoand a UN Civil Affairs Officer, as well as a specialist in security and territorial dynamics in Mali. Drawing on his field experience and regional expertise, Lilly offers a critical assessment of the country’s deepening crisis, highlighting how political decisions, international isolation, and reliance on foreign mercenaries have contributed to the erosion of state authority. The ongoing fuel blockade and the growing influence of armed groups are presented as clear indicators of a broader breakdown in governance and security.
The discussion also examines the evolving dynamics in northern Mali, including the situation of Tuaregcommunities, the absence of meaningful external support, and the shifting balance between armed actors such as JNIM. It underscores the risks of further fragmentation and instability, not only for Mali but for the wider region. At the same time, the interview points to the need for a political solution, emphasizing the restoration of constitutional order and the revival of peace agreements as essential steps toward lasting stability.
Mohamed Lilly
It all started with the double coup d’état and the petty positions taken by the Malian transitional authorities at the United Nations Security Council, where the country continues to accuse its neighbors of openly supporting terrorism. Mali’s withdrawal from ECOWAS and other international institutions, as well as the recruitment of Russian mercenaries accused of war crimes against certain communities, have greatly contributed to the worsening of the current crisis—particularly against the Tuaregs, Arabs, and Fulani, as evidenced by the Mourrahmassacre.
The refusal of the authorities to allow the UN to investigate summary and extrajudicial executions, particularly against Fulani families, was followed by accusations against MINUSMA, described as an instrument of the West serving France. Accusations considered fanciful, aimed at discrediting the UN mission and justifying the use of mercenaries.
Furthermore, the massacres carried out by the Malian army and the Russian auxiliaries of the paramilitary group have resulted in strengthening the ranks of JNIM. Its leader, a former Malian diplomat, is described as a fine strategist and an excellent expert of the terrain and the Malian army. He is now suffocating the capital, gaining ground, and spreading his message with the support of his influential deputy Amadou Kouffa, very active in central Mali.
All these factors have contributed to the escalation of security instability and the weakening of the state.
Isolation, ethnic tensions, and the abandonment of the Tuaregcommunities
There is no support for the Tuareg people. In fact, the Malian state has clear intentions of ethnic cleansing against Arab-Tuareg and Fulani communities. At this moment, the only support for the Tuaregs is training in the use of small drones by Ukrainians offered to the FLA by Ukraine, because the Coordination of Movements is fighting Russian mercenaries who are targeting Tuareg and Arab families in northern Mali. Human rights violations by the Malian junta are blatant. No support, whether logistical or otherwise, is provided except the training of a few young people.
A Regime losing legitimacy and regional support
Mali has lost all credibility with its neighbors. Algeria supported Mali unwaveringly until the current authorities accused it of all evils. Today Mali is isolated; almost no country is on good terms with the tyrant currently in power. The only alliance that exists is that of the AES, which is moreover a kind of association of illegitimate regimes that have created chaos, withdrawn from international bodies, and lost all foreign partners because of insecurity. Mali, Niger, and Burkina have become a space for trafficking of human organs, gold, hostages, and the economic flow of migrants, who are practically every day affected by drone strikes. On November 21, five Nigerian economic migrants were hit by a drone strike and were afterward labeled as terrorists in the Kidal region, circle of Abeibara.
JNIM’s strategy: Weakening the state without seizing power
JNIM does not intend to take Bamako but to provoke the سقوط (fall) of the military regime in power, already weakened due to its propaganda to the population and lies, while the realities on the ground are different. The current scenario is similar to the one that led Tiekounda Traoré to call for help during the time of François Hollande.
This is one of the scenarios that JNIM leaders have even followed, that of Syria, where a military dictator in power, in collaboration with mercenaries, refuses to give up power, and a former terrorist leader becomes president—today a defender of democracy.
The only way out: Constitutional order and renewed peace agreements
I am not from JNIM, but one thing is certain: there are two terrorist groups, one aggressive against civilian populations (EIGS) and the other targeting only the Malian Armed Forces and Russian mercenaries (JNIM). I always repeat that the only solution to the Malian crisis is the return to constitutional order and peace agreements with the Tuaregindependence movements (Algiers Agreement).